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Using Benefit-Cost Criteria for Settling
Federalism Disputes: An Application to
Food Safety Regulation
Julie A. Caswell and Jaana K. Kleinschmit v, L.
Federalism disputes arising from state regulations, particularly those pursuing health,
safety, and environmental goals, are common in the U.S. political system. Discussion
of bases for settling such disputes often focuses on the in- and out-state incidence of
benefits and costs, but incidence is a complex concept that has not been
systematically analyzed. We discuss five dimensions important to evaluating
incidence and present benefit-cost spillover criteria for judging federalism disputes.
When applied to a Massachusetts regulation of Alar residues in heat-processed apple
products, the criteria reach different conclusions on its appropriateness, highlighting
key considerations in evaluating state regulation in a federal system.
Key words: benefit-cost criteria, federalism, food safety.

Federalism disputes over the legitimate spheres
of state and federal regulatory powers are an
everyday occurrence in the United States. State
laws have the potential of burdening interstate
commerce or conflicting with or impinging on
federal law and may be challenged in court or
by new federal laws limiting their scope and
use. Disputes arising from state regulation,
whose purpose is to protect health, welfare, or
the environment, are especially difficult to resolve. They pose thorny issues of whether laws
are motivated by legitimate or rent-seeking
concerns and of how to measure the levels and
incidence of benefits and costs.
Our purpose is to contribute to the analysis
and management of state-federal regulatory relationships by systematically presenting and
evaluating benefit-cost criteria for judging federalism disputes. The criteria are designed to be
useful in court cases challenging state laws; to
congressional discussion of the merits of preempting particular state laws and regulations;
and to the parallel case of country-country con-
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flicts over regulations under international trade
agreements. We present an application of the
criteria to food safety with a case study of state
regulation in the late 1980s of Alar" residues in
processed apple products. I

Legal Approaches to Federalism Disputes
The U.S. political system contains an inherent
tension between federal power and states'
rights. It requires continuous balancing of the
federal government's interest in maintaining an
unhindered national market and in regulating
interstate commerce, with the states' interest in
legislating to meet the needs of their separate
constituencies. The large body of case law and
legal literature in this area focuses on standards
for judging whether state laws pose undue burdens on interstate commerce or are preempted
by the explicit language or implicit intent of
federal laws.
There are two major avenues of challenge to
state and local laws under the U.S. constitution.
First, the commerce clause is relied on in court
challenges of state laws in areas where Congress has not acted. The federal courts' general

I Alar is a registered trademark of Uniroyal Inc., which was its
sole producer.
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protection of interstate commerce is based on
three beliefs: "national economic welfare is
maximized by free trade among the states;
states frequently perceive their best interests to
lie in erection of barriers to free trade in some
commodities or by some means; and Congress'
agenda is too crowded to rely on it as the sole
source of limitations on state barriers to interstate commerce (Pierce, p. 614)."2
Over the years, the courts have developed
tests to balance federal and state interests in
commerce clause cases. One influential test
was laid out in 1970 in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142: "Where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Legitimate local public
interests most prominently involve the protection of the safety, health, and welfare of state
citizens. The federal courts have traditionally
given fairly wide latitude to the states in this
area, even where some burden on interstate
commerce occurs, because they have found it
difficult to judge the state's against the national
interest. The necessary balancing has resulted
in recurrent conflict for the courts. As Foote
notes, "(t)he Supreme Court has developed a
relatively indeterminate balancing test, upholding state regulation that affects interstate commerce if the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest and if the state interest
in regulation outweighs the burden imposed on
commerce (1985, p. 118)."
For example, in Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977),
the state of North Carolina had prohibited the
use on labels of any grading system for apples
other than the one provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. North Carolina argued that
the presence of multiple grading systems could
cause confusion and harm to consumers. The
main negative impact of the law was on Washington state apple growers who argued they had
developed a superior grading system, which allowed greater marketability of their products
(Farber). The Supreme Court balanced the protectionist effect against the purported consumer

2 This area of law is commonly referred to as dormant commerce clause jurisprudence since "the language of the Constitution
does not explicitly refer to state interference with interstate commerce. It was only by interpreting the document's silence that
courts could ascertain the states' role in regulating commerce"
(Foote 1985, pp. 117-18).
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benefits, finding the pattern of the statute's
benefits and costs unacceptable and invalidating the state law. An important 1994 decision of
the Supreme Court invalidating Oregon's
higher disposal fees for out-state waste is a
continuation of the court's balancing of in- and
out-state interests in commerce clause cases.
The second major avenue for challenging
state law is the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which is employed for challenges
in areas where Congress has acted. In such
cases, the state often argues it is supplementing
federal regulation in order to increase protection of its citizens. Congress has the power to
block any form of state regulation and the
courts will find such a result where Congress
has made explicit its intent to preempt or limit
it. Frequently, however, Congress is not explicit, leaving the courts to judge whether it implicitly intended to preempt or limit such activity. In other cases, federal legislation explicitly
includes a role for state regulatory activities
and the challenge focuses on whether the state
has overstepped its specified role.
On their face, preemption cases do not involve the same type of balancing of interests
required in commerce clause cases. The courts
engage in analysis of conflict between laws
(e.g., is it possible to comply simultaneously
with the federal and state law); whether state
law obstructs congressional goals; and of congressional intent. However, the balancing of inversus out-state economic effects is inherent to
judging these federalism disputes as well. For
example, the degree to which a state law frustrates a federal purpose depends in part on the
scope and incidence of its impacts. The main
arena for resolving these type of federalism disputes is Congress, which can continually adjust
the relationship between federal and state law
through its decisions whether to include preemptive or limiting language in new legislation.
The legal treatment of federalism disputes
suggests several economic considerations important to their settlement. These center, although not in a precise manner, on the level of
benefits and costs arising from a state regulation and, very importantly, on their in- and outstate incidence. The relative level of in-state
benefits and costs will help to determine
whether the state has a legitimate interest in the
regulation. Beyond that, in a normative sense
and from the federal point of view, a state
regulation's validity is primarily tested based
on its spillover effect on other states, in other
words, on the burden it imposes on interstate
commerce and. state sovereignty. Historically,
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the courts and Congress have found evaluating
the benefits, costs, and their incidence for state
laws that protect health, welfare, and the environment especially difficult.
Economic Approaches to Federalism
Disputes
Outside the federalism context, the overall normative welfare economics test of a government
regulation is whether its benefits exceed its
costs. In the federalism context, the in- and outstate incidence of the regulation's effects takes
precedence in evaluating state regulations; economic models of federalism disputes have followed suit. For example, Rose-Ackerman develops a model of the tastes and preferences of
inhabitants of various states in order to measure
regulatory spillover effects between states. Political action in the federal system allows citizens to support laws that enable their state to
"export costs but support laws that reduce the
costs imposed on them (Rose-Ackerman, p.
152)." State laws may be used to avoid economic costs at the expense of others, and national laws (preemption) may be enacted in order to control the size of spillovers and the
costs of inconsistent laws.
Rice draws similar conclusions from his
analysis of differences in state laws governing
product-related quality and performance. He argues that states have a high degree of freedom
to enact laws of their choice and that the costs
of protective laws are not fully internalized
within the enacting jurisdictions as long as less
protective states exist, resulting in income redistribution. Legislatures of less protective
states will be inclined toward passing more protective laws in order to avoid negative
spillovers into their states and to encourage
positive spill-ins from the remaining less protective jurisdictions. The long-run outcome is
similar state laws that are not necessarily optimal and may differ significantly from regulatory preferences that would have been expressed at the federal level, with the federal
government and courts having roles to play in
controlling this phenomenon.
Foote's (1984) analysis of federalism disputes takes a separate but related tack. She
notes that the degree of conflict between state
and federal regulation of health and safety has
increased since the 1960s as the federal government increased its regulatory activity in this
area. Foote analyzes this conflict by classifying
state regulations into five stages based on
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where their impact is felt (product standards,
production standards, process of .exchange,
conditions of sale and point-of-sale services,
and conditions of use) and argues that each
class has a likely pattern of benefits and costs
that should dictate whether preemption of state
law is appropriate. With qualifications, she concludes that preemption of state law is most frequently justified in the first three stages.
These models offer useful insights into the
probable incidence of the benefits and costs of
state regulations but do not address the specifics of how incidence should be evaluated and
measured. Some guidance is attempted by
Pierce in his model of geographical spillovers
which focuses on the degree to which state
regulation is evenhanded. The theory is that
"the state's political process will produce a reasonable balance of regulatory benefits and burdens from a national perspective if, but only if,
there is at least a rough equivalence between
the proportion of total benefits that accrue to
in-state interests and the proportion of total
burdens that are imposed on in-state interests
(p. 647)." Pierce summarizes his spillover criterion as follows:
States should be allowed to make regulatory
decisions with no geographic spillover (or with
negative spillover equal in percentage to positive spillover), but they should not be allowed
to make regulatory decisions with either positive or negative geographic spillover (or, more
accurately, with disproportionate positive or
negative spillover) (p. 653).

This criterion and the legal/economic approaches discussed above suggest several formal benefit-cost spillover criteria for settling
federalism disputes.
Benefit-Cost Spillover Criteria for Assessing
State Regulation
A key consideration in legal and economic analyses of federalism disputes is the degree to which
the impacts of state regulation spill over to other
states. Too much spillover is almost uniformly
deemed to be legitimate grounds for blocking
state regulation, either through invalidation under
the commerce clause or preemption under federal
law. The difficulty arises in conceptualizing
and quantifying how much is too much.
We develop spillover criteria that focus on
the short run where a state regulation has gone
into effect but no new regulatory response has
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been made by other states or the federal government. (Analysis of longer-term impacts involves adding terms reflecting further regulatory adjustments.) The short-run benefits of a
state regulation can be expressed as
2

SB

n

= I Isbij
i=1 j=1

where sb., are the benefits accruing to a particular interest group j (j = 1, ..., n) and the i subscript indicates whether the group is in-state (i
= 1) or out-state (i = 2). The total short-run instate benefits are as follows:
n

SB, =

I

sblj'

j=1

Total short-run out-state spillover benefits are
n

SBz ==

I

sb2 j •

j=1

Short-run total costs can be expressed as
2

SC

n

= I Isc ij
i=1 j=1

with short-run in-state costs expressed as SCI
and out-state spillover costs expressed as SC 2 •
This model is flexible in analyzing the benefits
and costs arising from state regulation since net
benefits (benefits minus costs) can be determined for interest groups, states, or nationwide.
From the above discussion, we can identify
five dimensions (table 1) of the incidence of inand out-state benefits and costs that should be
important in the normative evaluation of state
regulations (all measures are stated in dollar
terms). First is the absolute size of out-state
benefits and costs, SB 2 and SC 2 , compared to a
value D specified by the courts or policy makers. A state regulation with spillovers that are
large in dollar terms, regardless of the balance
between benefits and costs, may be unacceptable because those experiencing the spillovers
were not represented in the state political process that produced the regulation. The second
dimension is the relative size of out-state benefits and costs, which may be expressed based
on the size of SB z compared to SC z, or as an
out-state benefit-cost ratio that exceeds, equals,
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or is less than a specified value E (e.g., 1). For
example, a state regulation may be unacceptable if spillover benefits exceed spillover costs.
Third is the out-state share of total benefits and
costs compared to a specified value F. A state
regulation may be unacceptable if a large percentage of its benefits and costs are experienced out-state by parties who did not participate in the in-state political process. The fourth
dimension is the absolute size of in- versus outstate benefits and costs (SB I versus SB z and SCI
versus SC 2 ) . A state regulation may be unacceptable if out-state benefits or costs are larger
than those in-state. Finally, the fifth dimension
is the relative size of in- versus out-state benefit-cost ratios. A state regulation may be unacceptable if the in-state benefit-cost ratio is significantly higher than the out-state ratio.
In practice, evaluations of state regulations
meld these five dimensions with some subset
often taking prominence based on the circumstances of a particular law. However, considering them separately is important to a clear
evaluation of state regulations. For example, a
state law may generate out-state benefits
greater than costs (dimension 2) and have a
small share of total benefits and costs out-state
(dimension 3), suggesting it is acceptable in
normative terms, but have out-state benefits
and costs that are very large in absolute terms
(dimension 1), suggesting it is not acceptable.
A clear delineation allows these characteristics
to be balanced against each other.

Alternative Criteria

Benefit-cost spillover criteria for evaluating
state regulations should directly address one or
more of the above dimensions. Note again that
the overall benefit-cost ratio for the state regulation, while important from a total welfare
viewpoint, is not central to the development of
criteria to judge federalism disputes. This is the
case because these criteria focus on the
spillover dimensions, not on the overall desirability of the regulation. The normative rationale for this focus is that state regulation
should affect only parties within the state who
can participate in the political process and not
export benefits or costs to other states.
A potential initial criterion for judging federalism disputes is that the state regulation have
no spillover of benefits or costs to other states.
This criterion can be set aside because, since
virtually no state law would meet it, it would
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Table 1.' Dimensions Important to Spillover Criteria
Dimension

Description

Formulas

Absolute size of out-state
benefits and costs
2

Out-state share of total
benefits and costs

4

SB 2

>
<
SC

SBz >
=F
SB <

>

<SB

2

Relative size of in- versus

SBt

out-state benefit-cost ratios

SCI <: SCz

invariably suggest state laws be invalidated
with all regulation on the federal level. We develop four alternative criteria (table 2) for
evaluating state regulation.

Criterion 1: maximum absolute spillover. Criterion 1 would require that the absolute size of
the spillovers of benefits and costs from a state
regulation be less than a specified value G (SB z
s G and SC z s: G). The criterion's advantage is
its focus on limiting the absolute size of
spillovers (dimension 1) and thus the impact of
decisions made in one state on parties in other
states. Its disadvantages are that it does not address the other dimensions important to
spillover criteria that involve value comparisons (e.g., relative size of out-state benefits and
costs, out-state share of total benefits and costs)
and defining a value for G may be difficult in
practice (e.g., should the value of G be the
same for regulations affecting industries of
very different sizes).

Criterion 2: no net negative spillover. Criterion 2 would require that a state regulation
avoid any net negative spillover of benefits and
costs to other states, i.e., that out-state benefits
be greater than or equal to out-state costs, SB z ~
SC z• Its main advantage is the prevention of negative spillovers, assuring that exported benefits are
at least as great as exported costs (SBiSC z ~ 1);
it thus addresses dimension 2 for spillover criteria. The criterion has a disadvantage in this
regard, however, in that it does not treat net

~

SBz
~E
SCz <

-2

-

SB t

>
<
D

SC 2

Absolute size of in- versus
out-state benefits and costs

5

>
<
D

Relative size of out-state
benefits and costs

3

SB 2

SCz

--

SC
SC t

~F

<

>
<
SC

2

SB

z
--

positive and negative spillovers symmetrically,
allowing large positive spillovers of benefits,
which are still spillovers, but disallowing state
regulations with any negative spillover, no matter how small. It also does not place a constraint on the absolute size of out-state benefits
or costs (dimension 1) or include any comparison of in- and out-state benefits and costs (dimensions 3-5).

Criterion 3: no disproportionate spillover.
Criterion 3 would require that a state regulation
have no disproportionate spillover of benefits
and costs to other states. There are several alternative ways to state this criterion. It equates
the ratio of in-state benefits to total benefits to
the ratio of in-state costs to total costs plus or
minus a judgment factor H (SB/SB = SC/SC ±
H) and, similarly, for out-state benefits and
costs (SBiSB = SCiSC ± H). It also can be
stated in terms of equating in- and out-state
benefit-cost ratios to the total benefit-cost ratio
plus or minus a judgment factor (SB/SC I = SBISC
± H, SB/SCz = SBISC ± H) or as setting the instate benefit-cost ratio equal to the out-state ratio plus or minus a judgment factor (SB/SC I =
SB/SCz ± H).3
Criterion 3's advantage is the avoidance of a
disproportionate export of benefits and costs to
other states, which presumably occurs most often in cases where the exported costs outweigh
the benefits, although the reverse scenario is
3 In the case of H = 0, this criterion requires an equal spillover
of benefits and costs.
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Table 2. Spillover Criteria for the Benefits and Costs of a State Regulation
Dimension Coverage"
Criterion

2
3

4

a

Description

Formulas

Maximum absolute
spillover
No net negative
spillover
No disproportionate
spillover

SB 2 s G
SC2~ G
SB 2 ~ SC 2
SB/SC2 ~ I
SB/SB = SC/SC ± H
SB 2/SB = SC/SC ± H
SB/SC\ = SB/SC ± H
SB/SC 2 = SB/SC ± H
SB/SC\ = SB/SC2 ± H
SB/SB s K

Maximum spillover
share

SC/SC~K

2

3

4

5

Y

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

y

N

Y = yes, N = no.

also possible. As Pierce notes, this affords outstate interests the same protection against passage of unreasonable laws as is enjoyed by instate parties, since both will experience the
same benefit-cost ratio. The criterion also has
the advantage of symmetrical treatment of
spillover benefits and costs. It addresses dimension 2 by requiring the out-state benefit-cost ratio be equal to the total ratio plus an adjustment
factor of H, (SB/SC 2 = SB/SC ± H). Dimension
5 is also covered as in- and out-state benefitcost ratios are equated, again with an adjustment factor of H(SB/SC 1 = SB/SC2 ± H).
Criterion 3 has three disadvantages. One, it
imposes no constraints on the relative size of
in- and out-state benefits and costs (dimension
4). Hypothetically, all of the benefits and costs
could be exported and still meet this criterion.
Second, the criterion places no constraints on
the absolute size of the spillovers (dimension 1)
or the share of benefits and costs exported (dimension 3). Third, it may be difficult in practice to define H (i.e., how disproportionate
should be operationalized).

Criterion 4: maximum spillover share. Criterion 4 would constrain the share of the total
benefits or costs of a state regulation that may
be exported to a specified value K (SB 2/SB :5'; K,
SC 2/SC :5'; K); for example, 0.2% or 20%. The
criterion's advantage is that it places a proportional limit on the extent of in- versus out-state
impacts (dimension 3), limiting the impact of
exports to parties in other states. It also addresses dimension 4 by constraining the absolute size of in- versus out-state benefits and

costs, with the relationship depending on the
definition of K. For example, if K is defined to
be less than 0.5, in-state will be restricted to be
greater than out-state benefits (SB I > SB 2 ) and
in-state to be greater than out-state costs. Its
disadvantages are it places no limit on the absolute or relative size of exported benefits and
costs (dimensions I and 2), or on the in-state
relative to the out-state benefit-cost ratio (dimension 5). Also, the definition of K may be
difficult in practice.

Criteria summary. The four criteria formalize
and systematically relate measures of spillovers
from state regulations that are of normative importance in settling federalism disputes. As
table 2 shows, none of the criteria covers all
five dimensions of spillover incidence, making
use of a combination of three or more necessary
for full coverage. Only criterion I addresses dimension 1 providing a sense of the absolute
size of spillovers. Both criteria 2 and 3 provide
coverage of dimension 2, but impose different
constraints on the relative size of out-state benefits and costs. Criterion 2 is more restrictive
because it rules out any state regulation with
negative net spillover, even when such
spillovers are small. Criterion 3 is also the only
standard that provides coverage of dimension 5,
while criterion 4 is the only one that addresses
dimensions 3 and 4.
A combination of criteria 1, 3, and 4 alone
gives full dimension coverage but constitutes a
fairly rigorous test of the appropriateness of
state regulations. For this reason, analysts may
prefer to include use of criterion 2 in evalua-
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tions of state regulations, since it allows the
most latitude for state regulation. For application, the criteria require the actual measurement
or estimation of all in- and out-state benefits
and costs in monetary terms.

Applying the Spillover Criteria: The Case of
Alar Residues
The federalism dispute arising from state regulation of daminozide (Alar) residues in heatprocessed apple products is an example of the
type of situation in which spillover criteria may
be usefully applied. Such state regulations are
often seen as a burden on interstate commerce
by producers, processors, and retailers who
seek court invalidation or preemption by federal law. The states, and groups within states,
often view such regulation as a necessary tool
to address their varying needs. Congress has
legislated on pesticide residues but not explicitly preempted all state action. In the mid
1980s, the state of Massachusetts introduced
stricter daminozide residue standards for heatprocessed apple products than those of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency." In such
cases, the courts and Congress must determine
how to settle the federalism dispute.

Case Background

Alar is a growth regulator that was primarily
used by apple growers to prevent early drop of
apples so that fruit stayed hanging on the tree
to ripen to a crisp, red, fresh-looking product
(U.S. EPA 1984). In economic terms, Alar also
helped to reduce picking costs because fewer
pickers could harvest for a longer period of
time, and shelf life of the product was enhanced. Because Alar is absorbed by the plant
and its fruit, it cannot be washed off before
consumption or during processing. Heat processing decomposes Alar into another, more
toxic component UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) (U.S. EPA 1987a).
Daminozide was originally registered in 1963
for use on apples, with the residue tolerance
level set at 30 parts per million (ppm) (U.S.
EPA 1985, van Ravenswaay and Hoehn). No
residue level was set for UDMH. In 1984, the
EPA announced its intent to conduct a new risk

4 New York and Maine also sought to set their own standards.
For purposes of this application, we ignore their activities.
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assessment of daminozide and UDMH, including review of animal studies done in the 1970s.
As a result, EPA classified daminozide, as well
as UDMH, as probable human carcinogens
(U.S. EPA 1985). It also recommended to its
Scientific Advisory Panel that Alar be banned.
However, the panel found the evidence that
daminozide is carcinogenic to be inadequate
and EPA withdrew from its intent to ban (U.S.
EPA 1986). Instead, it established a lower residue tolerance level of 20 ppm and ordered
Uniroyal to conduct new tests on the degree of
toxicity (U.S. EPA 1986, 1987b).
In February 1989, EPA announced that preliminary results from the new Uniroyal studies
indicated the cancer risk posed by Alar was unacceptable (U.S. EPA 1989a) and EPA was
likely to seek cancelation of Alar's registration
when the tests were complete (van Ravenswaay
and Hoehn). Spring 1989 saw intense media
scrutiny of Alar, with special attention to residues in children's food. In fact, the broad discussion of the Alar controversy in the printed
press and on popular TV shows such as 60 Minutes throughout the late 1980s led to an enormous increase in consumer concern about eating apples and apple products (van Ravenswaay
and Hoehn). In June 1989, Uniroyal voluntarily
halted sales of Alar, and in October Uniroyal
requested voluntary cancelation of the food-use
registrations of products containing daminozide,
effectively removing Alar from the market.
In 1986, the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health was not satisfied with EPA's actions regarding Alar and its reduction of residue
tolerance levels for apples from 30 to 20 ppm.
It felt that this reduction would not provide sufficient incentives to further reduce residue levels or have the effect of lowering dietary exposure, especially for infants and children (U.S.
EPA 1987b). In 1986, the state of Massachusetts instituted its own residue tolerances for
daminozide in heat-processed apple products
(Massachusetts Department of Public Health),
while not setting a standard for fresh apples in
order to avoid a direct confrontation with EPA.
Under the state standards, as of 1 October
1986, the residue tolerance was set at 5 ppm for
heat-processed apple products and 1 ppm for
baby foods. The residues were to decrease to 1
ppm in heat-processed products and to nondetectable for baby foods by 1 October 1987, and
to non-detectable in all heat-processed apple
products by 1 October 1988.
The Massachusetts regulation on Alar residues occurred during a period of great market
uncertainty regarding Alar's ultimate fate. Pro-
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cessors and retailers found themselves in a difficult situation, with many believing the national standard would likely change to that of
M.assachusetts in the near future. The general
climate of uncertainty, along with the Massachusetts action, led much of private industry to
declare voluntary boycotts on Alar-treated
apples and apple products (Consumer Reports).
In other words, many voluntarily applied the
Massachusetts standard outside Massachusetts,
pursuing a single, national, Alar-free product
strategy. This led to protection of the health of
consumers outside the state and possible higher
costs and prices for Alar-free food products.
In our estimates, we analyze four separate
spillover scenarios representing different reactions to the Massachusetts regulation:
1. Single product strategy: producers, processors, and distributors reacted to the Massachusetts regulation by producing a single
Alar-free product to be sold nationwide.
This case results in the maximum spillover
of benefits and costs to other states.
2. Dual product strategy (no price premium for
Alar-free products): producers, processors, and
distributors reacted by producing dual products-an Alar-free product for sale in Massachusetts and a regular product to be sold elsewhere, receiving no premium for Alar-free
product sold in Massachusetts. This case results in small spillovers of benefits and costs.
3. Dual product strategy (partial price premium
for Alar-free products): same as case 2 with
partial premium for Alar-free products.
4. Dual product strategy (full price premium
for Alar-free products): same as case 2 with
full premium for Alar-free products.
Benefits and costs are calculated on a yearly
basis with results presented for 1987. Analysis
of the size and incidence of the estimated benefits and costs of the Massachusetts regulation,
developed in the next sections, contributes to
settling this federalism dispute by quantifying
the claims of the various involved parties.
Benefits Estimation: Placing a Monetary Value
on Changes in Health
The major benefit expected from reducing Alar
residues in heat-processed apple products is an
improvement in human health, either decreased
morbidity or mortality. Benefits measurement
requires placing a monetary value on the health
improvement but also on other factors such as

Benefit-Cost Criteria for Settling Federalism Disputes
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pos.sible reduction in consumer anxiety and in
actions taken to avoid the risk. We use two
separate approaches to yield benefit estimates
for the single and dual product cases. The benefits are calculated per person and then estimated by state based on state population figures
for 1987 by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Census Population Division. All calculations are reported in 1987 dollars.
Approach 1. The main measure used for imdue .to reduction in exposure to pesticide residue risk is a reduction in excess cancer cases. Analysts state this risk as additional
lifetime risk of getting cancer per a population
(e.g., a 1*10- 6 risk translates to one more cancer per million people over a lifetime exposure). During the 1980s, EPA, some states, and
private groups issued risk assessments for Alar
and UDMH. Since our focus is heat-processed
~pple pro?ucts, we rely on the EPA's two published estimates during this period for the general population for risk associated with the
breakdown product of darninozide, UDMH, in
apple products. EPA's 1985 risk estimate for
UDMH in apple products was 1*10--4 or an estim~te~ 1~O extra cancers per million people
WIth lifetime exposure. EPA's 1989 estimate for
UDMH in apple products is 1.4*10- 5 or 14 extra cancers in 1 million people." In the benefits
estimation we treat the EPA estimates as 100
and 14 extra cancer deaths, which results in
some overestimation of benefits.
Several methods are in use for calculating the
value of a human statistical life. Fisher, Chestnut, and Violette argue that the most credible
measure of the value of reducing risk is the
amount people are willing to pay for the risk red~c~ion. They discuss three major categories of
willingness-to-pay estimation studies: wage-risk
studies, contingent valuation studies, and consumer market studies. Fisher, Chestnut, and
Violet~e's review of these studies suggest a range
of estimates for the value-per-statistical-life
based on death rates of $1.6 to $8.5 million
in 1986 dollars, and that this range is useful
for evaluating policies expected to extend lives.
A range of benefits for reducing exposure to
~r~veme~t

. s Ot~er risk estimates generally fall within this range, although
risk estimates for all food products and specific population groups,
especially children under one year of age, are higher (U.S. EPA
19~5, 1989a, 1989b). The state of Massachusetts's published risk
estimate was 120 extra cancers per 1 million people for a 5 ppm
residue level in apple products, and 24 extra cancers for a 1 ppm
tolerance level (Massachusetts Department of Public Health). The
Natural Resources Defense Council's estimate published in 1989
was 41 cancers per one million people (Sewell and Whyatt).
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residues is estimated based on the Fisher,
Chestnut, and Violette value of life and EPA
risk estimates. The low value of life is $1.6
million and the high value is $8.5 million, or
$1,656,000 and $8,797,500 in 1987 dollars. The
risk estimates for UDMH in apple products are
the 1985 estimate of 1*10-4 and the 1989 estimate of 1.4*10-5, or 100*10- 6 and 14*10- 6 , respectively. These estimates are for a lifetime,
which is assumed to be seventy years. Therefore the annual risk levels for the above estimates are 1.4*10- 6 and 0.2*10-6 (i.e., 1.4 or 0.2
cancer deaths per million people per year)." A
range of dollar benefits per million people per
year for avoidance of this risk is calculated by
multiplying the two value of life estimates by
the two risk estimates:
1. $1,656,000 * 0.2 = $331,200
(lower value of life * lower risk),
2. $8,797,500 * 0.2 = $1,759,500
(higher value of life * lower risk),
3. $1,656,000 * 1.4 = $2,318,400
(lower value of life * higher risk),
4. $8,797,500 * 1.4 = $12,316,500
(higher value of life * higher risk).

These translate to an annual per capita willingness to pay of $0.33, $1.76, $2.32, and $12.32.
The benefits based on this estimation for the
single product strategy case are reported in the
first panel of table 3, columns 1, 3, 4, and 5. Instate (Massachusetts) benefits (SB\) range from
a low of about $2 million to a high of $72 million. Benefits also accrue to all out-state consumers because they are offered Alar-free products. Out-state benefits (SB 2 ) range from $78
million to $3 billion. Benefits for the dual product strategy case with no price premium are
also reported in the first panel of table 3 (columns1, 3, 4, and 5). In-state benefits are the
same as in the single product case while outstate benefits are zero because out-state consumers are not offered Alar-free products.
Approach 2. In a consumer market study, van
Ravenswaay and Hoehn measured changes in
consumer behavior after the public became
aware that Alar was a suspected carcinogen.
They estimated consumers' implied willingness
to pay for Alar-free apples and cancer risk reductions. This estimate includes a wide set of
benefits including reduction in morbidity and

6

Respectively. 100170 = 1.4 and 14170 = 0.2.
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mortality, anxiety and fear, and expenditures to
avert or mitigate the risk. Annual per capita
willingness to pay to avoid Alar in processed
apple products can be calculated based on these
results without using value of life or EPA risk
estimates. Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn estimated that in 1987 consumers were willing to
pay $1.31 or 17.4% of apple expenditures per
capita to avoid Alar in apples. To estimate willingness to pay for Alar-free heat-processed
apple products, we apply this percentage to expenditures on these products. Dollar value of
shipments data for the relevant seven-digit
Standard Industrial Classification products for
the year 1982 are used as a proxy for processed
apple expenditures per capita since no data are
available on them.' The 1982 figures are used
to exclude the effects of sales losses that may
have occurred in these products after 1984 due
to publicity about risks associated with Alar.
The U.S. total value of shipments for processed apple products in the relevant sevendigit SIC codes in 1982 was $781.1 million."
The U.S. population for the same year was
231,995,000 (U.S. Department of Census, Bureau
of the Census Population Division), resulting in a
per capita expenditure on processed apple products of $3.37 for 1982, or $4.64 in 1987 dollars."
Applying van Ravenswaay and Hoehn's willingness-to-pay estimate of 17.4% of expenditures,
we calculate a per capita willingness to pay of
$0.81 per year to avoid Alar in processed apple
products. Based on 1987 state populations, for the
single product case this yields calculated in-state
(Massachusetts) benefits of $4.7 million and outstate (all other states) benefits of $192 million
(first panel of table 3, column 2). For the dual
product case with no price premium for Alar-free
products, in-state benefits are the same while outstate benefits are zero (first panel of table 3, column 2). These figures fall within the range generated by the first benefits estimation approach.
We employ van Ravenswaay and Hoehn's
market-based willingness-to-pay measure to

7 The relevant seven-digit products are as follows: SIC 2032111
canned baby foods, fruits; SIC 2032171 canned baby food, juices;
SIC 2033112 canned fruits, apples; SIC 2033113 canned fruits,
applesauce; SIC 2033161 canned fruit, pie mixes, apple; SIC
2033All canned fruit juices and nectars, single strength: apple
juice; SIC 2034321 dried and dehydrated fruits: apples; and SIC
2037155 frozen fruits: apples and applesauce (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1982 Census of Manufactures).
8 The SIC data did not list value of shipments for SIC 2032111,
canned baby foods, fruits for 1982 because of disclosure problems.
This SIC is not included in the calculations.
9 The consumer price index for apples for all urban consumers was
applied. The value for July 1982 = 331.8 and July 1987 =457.0, for a
ratio of 457/331.8 = 1.377 (U.S. Department of Labor 1982, 1987).
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Table 3. Estimated Benefits of Massachusetts Regulation for Four Product Strategies (in Millions)
Willingness-to-Pay Estimates
Row

Benefit Measures

Single product strategy
1
SB\
2
SB 2
3
SB
Dual product strategy (no premium)
4
SB\
SB 2
5
6
SB

P

2b

3c

4d

5e

$1.9
$78.2
$80.1

$4.7
$191.9
$196.6

$10.3
$417.0
$427.3

$13.6
$549.7
$563.2

$72.1
$2,918.9
$2,991.0

$1.9
$0.0
$1.9

$4.7
$0.0
$4.7

$10.3
$0.0
$10.3

$13.6
$0.0
$13.6

$72.1
$0.0
$72.1

With Partial
Premium
Dual product strategy
SB\ (Consumer)
7a
7b
SB\ (Proc.ldist.)
SB\ (Total)
7
SB 2 (Consumer)
8a
SB 2 (Proc.ldist.)
8b
SB 2 (Total)
8
9
SB

$2.4
$0.7
$3.1
$0.0
$1.6
$1.6
$4.7

With Full
Premium
$0.0
$1.5
$1.5
$0.0
$3.2
$3.2
$4.7

Fisher et al. based estimate of per capita willingness to pay of $0.33 at lower value of life and lower risk.
Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn based estimate of per capita willingness to pay of $0.81.
C Fisher et al. based estimate of per capita willingness to pay of $1.76 at higher value of life and lower risk.
d Fisher et al. based estimate of per capita willingness to pay of $2.32 at lower value of like and higher risk.
e Fisher et al. based estimate of per capita willingness to pay of $12.32 at higher value of life and higher risk.
a

b

generate benefits estimates for the two dualproduct strategy scenarios that involve price
premiums for Alar-free products. We assume
their willingness-to-pay estimate is the maximum total premium processors and distributors
would be able to capture from consumers
through higher prices for Alar-free products. to
In our estimates, if a price premium is received,
the premium is deducted from the consumer
benefit and credited to that of the processors
and distributors. The second panel of table 3
shows the distribution of benefits with the assumption that processors and distributors capture 50% (partial premium) and 100% (full premium) of the willingness to pay, respectively.
The distribution of benefits to in- and out-state
companies is discussed below.

10 Our use of partial and full premium cases represents a range
of premium sizes and capture rates. For example, a premium of
50% of van Ravenswaay and Hoehn's willingness to pay is equal
to a 100% capture of a willingness to pay of half its size.

Cost Estimation
The costs of loss of Alar in apple production,
processing, and distribution are calculated
based on EPA and our estimates. The two major
benefits of Alar use in apple production are increased storage life and preharvest fruit drop
prevention (U.S. EPA 1985). Other listed benefits are quality improvement effects such as
increased red color, delayed watercore, or
bruise reduction. EPA evaluated such quality
improvements due to Alar use with an apple
model that measured four benefit categories:
increase in storage life, increase in total supply
of fresh apples, reduction in pruning costs, and
early bearing of young trees (U.S. EPA 1985).
Without Alar, a decline was expected in the
supply of fresh apples, with a simultaneous increase in the supply of processed apples since
fresh apples of lower quality would be sold for
processing. Prices for fresh apples at the
farmgate were expected to increase by approximately 6%, and prices for processing apples to
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Table 4. Estimated Costs of Massachusetts Regulation for Single- and Dual-Product Strategies
(in Millions)
Single-Product Strategy
Row

Cost Measures

Dual-Product Strategy

In-State

Out-State

Total

In-State

Out-State

Total

Producer costs
1

$0.6

$32.3

$32.9

$0.3

$0.5

$0.8

Processor and distributor costs
2
0.1 % Cost increase
1.0% Cost increase
3
4
10.0% Cost increase

$0.0
$0.1
$0.7

$0.9
$9.3
$93.2

$0.9
$9.4
$93.9

$0.0
$0.1
$0.7

$0.0
$0.2
$1.6

$0.0
$0.3
$2.3

All costs
SC t (0.1 %)a
5
SC t (1.0%)b
6
SC t (10.0%)C
7
SCz (0.1 %)
8
SCz (1.0%)
9
SCz (10.0%)
10
SC (0.1 %)
11
SC(1.0%)
12
SC (10.0%)
13

$0.6
$0.7
$1.3

$0.3
$0.4
$1.0
$33.2
$41.6
$125.5

$0.5
$0.7
$2.1
$33.8
$42.3
$126.8

$0.8
$1.1
$3.1

Estimate for a 0.1 % cost increase.
Estimate for a 1.0% cost increase.
C Estimate for a 10.0% cost increase.

a

b

decrease by 10% (U.S. EPA 1985). Retail prices
for fresh apples were expected to increase by
$1.00 to $1.90 per bushel, and the price of processed apple products were expected to decline
but not enough to offset the increase for fresh
apples (U.S. EPA 1985). These price and quantity
effects result in an estimated reduction in consumer expenditures of $170 million and an overall net reduction in farmers' profits of $33 million. The EPA's estimate of total social costs from
loss of Alar nationally was roughly $60 million,
with an upper bound of $108 million. 11 We rely on
the EPA estimate of producer costs and develop
estimates of processing and distribution costs.
Costs to producers. The EPA estimated the
net reduction in producers' profits from nationalloss of Alar at $32.9 million. We allocate
this cost to the states based on their 1986 shares
of total production as reported in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Fruit: Situation and
Outlook Yearbook (1987).12 Overall production

11 Higher estimates of producer losses have been published
(e.g., O'Rourke) but they are for sales losses associated with an
Alar "scare," not for an orderly end of Alar use as is assumed in
the EPA estimates.
12 State-by-state shares were not available for 1987.

rather than data on specific varieties of apples
is used based on EPA's finding that Alar was
applied to almost all varieties for its broad
sphere of action (U.S. EPA 1985). In the single
product case, all producers stop using Alar resulting in total costs to producers of $32.9 million. In-state (Massachusetts) costs from loss of
Alar are $0.6 million and out-state costs are
$32.3 million (table 4, row 1, columns 1_3).13
In the three dual-product cases, net costs occur only for apple production destined for the
Massachusetts processed apple products market
which represents 2.4% of the national market.
The Massachusetts share of national apple production is 1.7%, while its share of apple processing is 0.75%. Our estimation assumes that the
maximum amount of in-state production affected
by the regulation is the amount that would fully
supply in-state processing (i.e., 0.75%). The difference is supplied out-state, with the costs incurred there. This results in in-state producer
costs of $0.3 million and out-state costs of $0.5
million (table 4, row 1, columns 4-6).

13 Note this procedure overestimates producer costs from loss of
Alar in growing apples for processing because the EPA estimates
are for loss of Alar in all apple production.
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Costs to processors and distributors. Cost estimates for processors and distributors from
loss of Alar are based on 1987 Census of Manufactures data. Census data do not generally list
information on apple processing at the sevendigit product level for individual states. Therefore SIC data on total U.S. processing volume
and individual state volume in the relevant fivedigit product classes were used to estimate each
state's share at the five-digit level. These state
shares were applied to total U.S. value of shipments of heat-processed apple products at the
seven-digit level to yield seven-digit state shares.
Thus the five- and seven-digit state volume shares
are assumed to be equal. The 1987 in-state (Massachusetts) processing value of shipments is calculated at $7.0 million, the out-state at $932.4
million, and the total at $939.4 million. 14
No reliable estimates exist of costs to processors and distributors due to the removal of Alar
from the market. EPA expected the actual cost
of processing apples to go down with loss of
Alar as more product was diverted to this market. However, over the longer term it is unlikely this effect would persist. Processors and
distributors might incur higher costs, especially
under a dual-product strategy, associated with
testing and segregating Alar-free products from
other products in the distribution chain. Given
the lack of data, we estimate potential costs
based on three scenarios: a 0.1 %, 1.0%, and
10.0 % increase in costs."
In the single-product case, all processors and
distributors experience the cost increases
shown in table 4, rows 2-4. They range in-state
from a low of $7,000 to a high of $0.7 million
and out-state from $0.9 to $93.2 million. For
the dual-product cases (table 4, rows 2-4), instate costs are the same as in the single-product
case. Out-state costs apply only to processed
apple products destined for the Massachusetts
market. We assume that apple products processed in-state stay in Massachusetts while the

14 The relevant seven-digit products are listed in footnote 7. The
SIC data did not list a value of shipments for SIC 2032111, canned
baby foods, fruits for 1987 because of disclosure problems. This
SIC is not included in the calculations. For SIC 2032171 canned
baby foods, juices, the data provide an estimate of $115.5 million
for 1982, with data withheld for 1987 due to disclosure problems.
Inflating this value to 1987 yields a value of shipments of $159.5
million, which is an overestimation for apple juice. The value of shipments figures are at wholesale prices. The 1982 figures suggest that,
after inflation, the value of shipments in these seven seven-digit
SICs in 1987 would have been $1,076.46 million. Actual figures
show the 1987 value of shipments to be $939.4 million. The difference presumably reflects lost sales due to publicity about Alar.
IS The 0.1 % increase in costs in practice results in a 0% increase.
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difference between in-state processing and consumption is supplied by other states. In this
case, out-state costs range from $0 to $1.6 million depending of the level of cost increase. When
added to the production costs estimated above,
three in-state (SCI)' out-state (SC 2 ) , and total
(SC) cost estimates are generated for the singleand dual-product cases (table 4, rows 5-13).
Applying Federalism Criteria to Estimated
Benefits and Costs
The federalism criteria are applied to the range
of estimated benefits and costs for the singleand dual-product cases to evaluate the federalism dispute arising from Massachusetts' regulation of daminozide residues in heat-processed
apple products. The benefit values shown in
table 3 were combined with the possible cost increases in table 4 to generate a range of benefit,
cost, and benefit-cost ratios to be used in this
analysis. Table 5 shows these ratios for the four
product cases using the benefit measures based
on van Ravenswaay and Hoehn's willingnessto-pay estimates." We discuss, in turn, the results of applying each of the spillover criteria.
Criterion 1: maximum absolute spillover. Criterion 1 judges the appropriateness of a state
regulation based on the absolute size of its
spillovers compared to a specified value G. In the
single-product case, the Massachusetts regulation
generates sizable out-state benefits and costs; the
estimated absolute spillover benefits, for example,
range from $78 to $2, 919 million. If the G-value
for benefits were set at $78 million or less, the
criterion would suggest invalidation or preemption is in order. Similarly, if the G-value for
spillover costs were set at $33 million or less, the
criterion would suggest the law should not stand
since estimated spillover costs range from $33 to
$126 million. If the G-values are set higher
than these levels, the regulation would be
deemed appropriate in the single product case.
In the three dual-product cases, spillover benefits are much smaller, ranging from zero to
$3.2 million, while spillover costs are also
much smaller, ranging from $0.5 to $2.1 mil-

16 The analytical results for the other willingness-to-pay estimates are the same as those reported in table 5 with one exception.
Under criterion 2, a combination of the lowest willingness to pay
of $0.33 with a 10% cost increase suggests the Massachusetts
regulation should be invalidated while all other benefit-cost combinations suggest it should be validated.
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Table 5. Benefit and Cost Ratios for Four Product Strategies, van Ravenswaay and Hoehn
Estimate of Willingness to Pay
Product Strategies

Row

Benefit and Cost Ratios

Single

Dual
(No Premium)

Dual
(Partial Premium)

Dual
(Full Premium)

I

SB/SB
SBiSB
SC/SC (O.l%)a
SC/SC (O.I%)b
SC/SC (10.0%)C
SCz/SC (0.1 %)
SC/SC (1.0%)
SC/SC (10.0%)
SB/SC (0.1%)
SB/SC (1.0%)
SB/SC (10.0%)
SB/SC\ (0.1%)
SB/SC 1 (1.0%)
SB/SC 1 (10.0%)
SB/SC z (0.1 %)
SB/SC z (1.0%)
SB/SC z (10.0%)

0.02
0.98
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.98
0.98
0.99
5.82
4.65
1.55
7.83
6.71
3.62
5.78
4.61
1.53

1.00
0.00
0.38
0.36
0.32
0.62
0.64
0.68
5.88
4.27
1.52
15.67
11.75
4.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.66
0.34
0.38
0.36
0.32
0.62
0.64
0.68
5.88
4.27
1.52
10.33
7.75
3.10
3.20
2.29
0.76

0.32
0.68
0.38
0.36
0.32
0.62
0.64
0.68
5.88
4.27
1.52
5.00
3.75
1.50
6.40
4.57
1.52

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
a
b
C

Estimate for a 0.1 % cost increase.
Estimate for a 1.0% cost increase.
Estimate for a 10.0% cost increase.

lion. Thus, under criterion 1 the Massachusetts
regulation would likely be deemed appropriate
in these cases.

Criterion 2: no net negative spillover. Criterion 2 judges a state regulation based on
whether there is any net negative spillover. It
can be stated as the requirement that the outstate benefit-cost ratio (SBz/SC z) be greater
than or equal to one (table 5, rows 15-17).
For the single-product case this is true, suggesting the Massachusetts regulation meets
criterion 2, exporting more benefits than
costs, and the courts and Congress should
not interfere with the state's activity. Application of the criterion yields the same result
for the dual-product cases with partial or full
premiums for Alar-free products, except for
the partial premium case with a 10% cost increase. However, if dual products are offered
with no price premium to processors and distributors, under criterion 2 the regulation
would be considered inappropriate because the
out-state benefit-cost ratio is zero since there
are no out-state benefits.

Criterion 3: no disproportionate spillover.
Under criterion 3 a state regulation is deemed
appropriate if there is no disproportionate
spillover, with the acceptable disproportionality
defined by the policy maker through specification of H values. Criterion 3 involves row comparisons in two groups. The first involves
analysis of benefit and cost shares. For the
single-product case, comparison of SB /SB
(table 5, row 1) with SC/SC (rows 3-5) indicates that the in-state share of the regulation's
total benefits (2%) is close to the in-state share
of total costs (l % to 2%). Similarly, comparison of SBzISB (99%) to SCz/SC (98%-99%),
shows a close match (rows 2 and 6-8). This set
of comparisons suggests that under criterion 3
the Massachusetts regulation likely would be
deemed appropriate and not a candidate for invalidation or preemption.
The second group compares benefit-cost ratios using three different formulas. Comparisons of in- and out-state benefit-cost ratios to
the total ratio (rows 12-14 to rows 9-11 and
rows 15-17 to rows 9-11, respectively) shows
that for the single-product case the in-state ratio
is greater than the total ratio while the out-state
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ratio is slightly smaller than the overall ratio.
The fact that out-state ratios closely match
overall ratios, suggesting no disproportionate
exporting of regulatory costs over benefits,
would make it likely that the Massachusetts
regulation would be judged appropriate under
criterion 3.
In the three dual-product cases the evaluation
of the regulation depends on the extent to
which Massachusetts consumers pay a premium
for access to Alar-free products. If they pay no
or a partial premium, criterion 3 would judge
the regulation inappropriate because in-state
parties experience 66%-100% of the benefits
but only 32%-38% of the costs (table 5, rows 1
and 3-5). However, if Massachusetts residents
pay a full premium for Alar-free products, they
experience 32% of the regulation's benefits and
32% to 38% of its costs. In this case, criterion 3
would judge the regulation appropriate because
it does not involve disproportionate export of
costs over benefits.

Criterion 4: maximum spillover share. Criterion 4 judges a state regulation based on
whether the out-state shares of total benefits
and costs are less than or equal to a specified
value K. In the single-product case, the outstate share of total benefits is 98% (table 5, row
2) and the out-state share of total costs is 98%99% (table 5, rows 6-8). Thus under criterion
4, if K is specified at anything less than 97%,
then the state regulation likely would be judged
inappropriate and a candidate for invalidation
or preemption. Criterion 4 would likely reach a
similar conclusion in all the dual-product cases
because the out-state shares of benefits are
zero, 34%, or 68%, while the out-state shares of
costs are 62%, 64%, and 68%, respectively
(table 5, rows 2 and 6-8). Thus unless K is
more than 62%-68% in the dual product cases,
criterion 4 would likely suggest invalidation or
preemption of the state regulation.

Settling the dispute. For the four product
cases presented, the spillover criteria give clear
but differing answers to the question of whether
the Massachusetts regulation of daminozide in
heat-processed apple products is appropriate.
Only criterion 4 would consistently judge the
regulation inappropriate regardless of whether
single- or dual-product strategies were followed
or the amount of premiums paid by Massachusetts consumers. It does so because, in all
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cases, too large a share of benefits or costs are
exported to other states.
The other three criteria yield a mix of judgments. In the single-product case, criterion 1
would judge the Massachusetts regulation inappropriate because the absolute size of the
spillovers is large, while it would not do so in
the dual-product cases where spillovers are
modest. Criterion 2 generally would judge the
regulation appropriate in all except the dualproduct no premium case because the out-state
benefit-cost ratio is greater than one. In the
dual-product no-premium case, however, the
out-state ratio is less than one. Finally, under
criterion 3 the regulation is likely to be seen as
appropriate in either the single-product or dualproduct full premium cases because out-state
benefit-cost ratios match overall ratios, suggesting no disproportionate exporting of costs
over benefits. In the dual-product no-premium
and partial-premium cases there is disproportionate export and the criterion would judge the
regulation inappropriate.
How does one settle the federalism dispute
based on these results? In terms of national impact, the Massachusetts regulation is likely to
have had a benefit-cost ratio well above one regardless of whether single- or dual-product
strategies were adopted. But in settling federalism disputes, the key factor is not the overall
ratio but the in- versus out-state incidence of
the regulation's benefits and costs. At minimum, under all but the dual-product no-premium scenario the regulation exported more
benefits than costs and could be judged to have
had a positive impact on states other than Massachusetts. However, exports of benefits over
costs still have parties in one state imposing
their regulatory choices on those in other states.
For this regulation, the exported share of the
regulation's impact is large across all product
strategies, although in the dual-product cases
the absolute dollar value of the exports is modest. Finally, the impact of the regulation is not
disproportionate if in-state consumers pay a full
premium for Alar-free products or if these
products are made available nationwide (the
single-product strategy).
The result of our evaluation is a complex picture. If we emphasize the degree to which the
impacts of the Massachusetts regulation are
out-state (criterion 4), we would conclude that
regulation of daminozide residues in heat-processed apple products is a more appropriate
subject for federal than state action. If we emphasize the other dimensions of spillover criteria, whether the Massachusetts regulation is

38

February 1997

deemed appropriate depends on whether singleor dual-product strategies are adopted and the
extent to which Massachusetts consumers pay
premiums for Alar-free products.

Conclusions

Federalism disputes arising from state regulation, particularly regulations pursuing health,
safety, and environmental goals, are a common
feature of the U.S. political system. Legal and
economic discussions of bases for settling such
disputes focus on the in- and out-state incidence of the state regulation's benefits and
costs. However, incidence is a complex concept
resulting in fuzziness in thinking about federalism disputes. The Congress, courts, and state
legislatures need to be more aware of specific
economic effects in deciding federalism questions. We discuss five dimensions important to
evaluating incidence and present practical benefit-cost spillover criteria based on them for
judging federalism disputes. When applied to a
Massachusetts regulation on Alar residues in
heat-processed apple products, the criteria
reach different conclusions on its appropriateness depending in part on how the market reacted to the regulation. The application illustrates how use of the spillover criteria can
clarify analysis of federalism disputes arising
from state regulations.
[Received August 1995;
final revision received October 1996.]
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